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Introduction and Summary of Argument 
Introduction 
This case should be viewed honestly for what it is: an attempt by 
a noncustodial father who has not visited one child since the Appellant, 
Kathleen Hamby, left him in October, 1984, and who may not have even 
ever seen the other child, born in April, 1985, to impose his surname 
on the two children he sired with Ms. Hamby to whom he was briefly 
married. 
The man, Gail Jacobson, is usually unemployed, has a drinking prob-
lem and is known for fighting. He physically abused the one child dur-
ing the 10-11 months Ms. Hamby lived with him in marriage. He gave no 
testimony whatsoever, let alone testimony to the effect that his in-
terest in having the children bear his name, rather than their mother's, 
was their interests, let alone their "best" interests. His counsel only 
"proffered" the following as his rationale for insisting that his off-
spring bear his last name: 
"We also, of couse, would dispute the legal conclusions as have 
been stated here and we would also have evidence that the defendant, 
while he wouldn't qualify for sainthood, nevertheless, his conduct 
is not such as would in any way be so unreasonable or outlandish 
that would require the Court in the interest of the children to 
take his name from them. Even if it were, even if his behavior were 
negative m some respects, likewise the applicant's character and be-
havior is negative. We won't want to get into that. I think the Court 
indicated that would not be an issue. So we would submit it on that 
statement of our proffer that if lie were called to make evidence 
that is what our evidence would be." (Respondent's Brief at A-9)(emphasis 
added). 
Furthermore, far from accepting a neutral and equal burden of proof 
for both parties with respect to the children's "best interests," the 
trial court put the burden on Ms. Hamby to demonstrate why the children 
should not bear the paternal name. Mr. Jacobson's counsel argued the 
i name marital r.h-ildrpn.tpi 
father's right toytne trial court and at the end of his Brief, the 
Respondent summarized the burden with which he would saddle Ms. Hamby 
to overcome the traditional finding for the patronymic: 
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"Appellant Kathleen Hamby failed to introduce sufficient evidence 
to justify the unorthodox, disruptive and potentially punitive 
selection of surnames £ sic} upon which she was insisting." 
Respondent's Brief at p.44. 
Even under the traditional standards/factors developed by the courts 
in the past to prevent older children who were originally given their 
fathers1 surnames, which their mothers also used, to assume stepfathers' 
names over the objection of their natural fathers, no trial court in the 
country in the 1980s should have awarded the right of naming the children 
to such a parent so that an appeal to a higher court would be necessary. 
The abuse of the trial court in this case is simply reprehensible. Yet, 
the instant situation is typical of cases occurring in trial courts 
across the nation as the law recognizes that men can no longer enjoy a 
superior right to name (marital) children. The Court is again referred 
to three articles and the cases and legal commentary cited in the same. 
MacDougall, "The Right of Women To Name Their Children,11 3 Journal of 
Law and Inequality 91(1985); Foggan, "Parents' Selection of Children's 
Surnames," 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 583 (1983), and Comment, "No Judicial 
Dyslexia: The Custodial Parent Presumption Distinguishes the Paternal 
From the Parental Right To Name a Child," 58 N.D.L. Rev. 793(1982). 
The purpose of this Reply is to respond to the numerous inaccuracies 
and distortions of the issues in and facts of the instant case, and the 
misconstructions and misusages of the law and legal commentrary presented 
by the Respondent's venomous brief against Ms. Hamby, to discuss the 
custodial parent presumption in view of the Respondent's objection to and 
misunderstanding of it, and to inform the Supreme Court of Utah of recent 
cases involving the naming of infant or very young children. 
The arguments of Ms. Hamby on behalf of herself and her children 
are discussed in her Initial Brief, are mostly not responded to by the 
Respondent, and are not reiterated herein except in response to some 
of the contentions in the Re^pndent's Brief. 
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Summary of Argument 
Preliminarily, instead of moving the Supreme Court for an Order to 
strike all the references to Ms. Hamby's character and presumed motives 
and actions proffered by the Respondent's counsel throughout his Brief 
which are not supported by evidence of record, Ms. Hamby is requesting 
that the Supreme Court disregard the same in considering the appeal before 
it. These and other inexcusable errors made in Respondent's Brief res-
pecting the issues and facts in the case will be pointed out in this 
Reply. 
Also preliminarily, although the transcript of court proceedings on 
October 24, 1985 should certainly be in the record of this case (as has 
been stipulated by the parties), testimony that has only been "proffered" 
through lawyers as conclusive without the benefit of clarifying question-
ing and the right of cross examination should not be accepted by any 
court of law as actual evidence. The Appellant asks the Supreme Court 
to disregard such unheard of "proffer" of evidence as actual evidence. 
The transcript is included in the Respondent's Brief, A-5--A-11. 
Second, it should be noted that the parties are in agreement as to 
two issues: 
1. The parties agree that the trial court had jurisdiction to de-
termine the dispute between the custodial and noncustodial parents 
over the infants' names in this case pursuant to its continuing 
jurisdiction over the care, custody and control of children pro-
vided by Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code. 
Except to point out that the Respondent is incorrect in stating on 
page 42 of his brief that "The jurisdiction of the lower court has 
never been contested by anyone. There is no jurisdictional issue for 
the Supreme Court of Utah to decide1,' this point will not be pursued 
further. The Supreme Court is referred to pages 29-32 of the Appellant's 
Initial Brief and "The Right of Women To Name Their Children," pages 
133-136. To guide the trial courts of Utah in future cases, the Court 
is respectfully requested to articulate the authority of Utah's lower 
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courts to entertain similar cases in the future. 
2. The parties are also in agreement that the legal standard for 
resolving a dispute between parents over their children's names is 
the "best interests of the child." 
Respondent states as an issue whether the trial court committed re-
versible error in "applying" the "best interests of the child" standard 
and "rejecting" Appellant's claim of a unilateral right to name the 
children involved. This is not a correct statement of the issue. 
Counsel for the Respondent either misunderstands or intentionally 
misconstrues the Appellant's position in this regard and the custodial 
parent presumption as set forth by Justice Mosk in In re Schiffman, 28 
Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980) as a means for 
applying the "best interests" standard. A presumption that the custodial 
parent acts in a child's best interests in determining what name a child 
should use, as well as in all other aspects of childrearing, is a sex-
neutral means by which the standard of the "best interests of the child" 
can be judicially applied. 
Third, in addition to ignoring the trend of the nation's courts in 
naming disputes to rule in favor of the custodial parent's choice of name 
in cases involving infant or very young children, the Respondent ignores 
the distinction between disputes between parents over the naming of 
infant/very young children and those, between parents over the renaming 
of older children who were originally given the patronymic which both 
parents used with the children in a family unit for a substantial period 
of time. 
This distinction between determining a child's name at birth, or 
when a child is an infant or very young, and changing it after the 
child has borne the name for several years, is all important. The standards 
and factors which were developed by courts and discussed by legal com-
mentators before the 1980s as a means to keep older children from adopting 
the surnames of stepfathers over their natural fathers' wishes,-either 
pursuant to an alleged "best interests11 standard or in open deference 
to a divorced father's "right" to have his offspring continue to bear his 
surname—are simply not applicable to situations involving the initial/ 
infancy naming of children. Respondent's use of caselaw involving older 
children is misplaced and misleading. 
Further, the Respondent's contention that Ms. Hamby should be saddled 
with the burden of demonstrating why the children should not bear the 
paternal surname derives from the aforementioned caselaw which was de-
veloped to prevent older children's changes of name. 
Fourth, a disturbing contention of the Respondent is that children 
should not use their mother's surname as a matter of policy if the mother's 
name was acquired during a prior marriage. 
Even if Utah's Legislature were to adopt such a policy, it would be 
in direct conflict with the common law and the Constitution of the United 
States. See Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P. 2d 1(1976); Jech v. 
Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979); O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 
494 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 
373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E. 2d 717(1977); Initial Brief, pages 21-28. Utah 
follows the common/constitutional law in this regard. The current Guide-
lines for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child on the Birth 
Certificate (revised October 5, 1981) state simply that "The surname to 
be given the child should be determined by the parents...When the child's 
mother is not married, she has considerable latitude in the name she gives 
the child. Even if the father is not named on the birth certificate, the 
mother may give the child a surname different than her own surname... and 
give the child a surname different than the father's." 
Argument 
I. Under any standard, the facts of this case do not support a finding 
that the children's best interests will be served by their bearing their 
father's, rather than their mother's, surname. 
As set forth in the Introduction, the Respondent Gail Jacobson has not 
set foot in court in this matter: he(andhis counsel) has given absolutely 
no testimony about why the children in Ms, Hamby's custody should bear 
his, rather than their mother's, surname. His counsel argued to the trial 
court that as the biological father of the children involved, Mr. Jacobson 
has "a common law right to have the child bear his name if he's going to 
be ordered to support and determined to be the father of the child." R. 
131. See also R. 147-148. At a subsequent proceeding on October 24, 1985, 
his counsel "proffered" the testimony set forth, supra. 
The Respondent is a man who is usually unemployed, who has a drinking 
problem and reputation for fighting, who has been in arrears in his child 
support obligations in the past and who physically abused and caused in-
jury to one of the children during the brief time he lived with Ms. Hamby 
in marriage. At the time of the evidentiary hearing in March, 198 5, Mr. 
Jacobson had not even visited the child since Ms. Hamby left five months 
prior thereto (R. 140, Reply Brief, A-140). There is no evidence that Mr. 
Jacobson has even ever seen, let alone visited with or cared for, the 
child born subsequent to the hearing in March, 198 51 At the October 24, 
1985 proceeding, several months late,r, his counsel did not even "proffer" 
that he has. 
The Respondent repeatedly claims that Ms. Hamby and Mr. Jacobson 
agreed to name the children with the name Jacobson (see, e.g. Respondent' s 
Brief at pages 9, 28 and 37). Ms. Hamby's live testimony does not at all, 
however, support that contention. Indeed, although such an agreement 
during the marriage would have no bearing on a determination of the child's 
best interests months later, Ms. Hamby was in court two days before de-
livering her last child testifying that she considered it in the children's 
best interests to bear the same name as the rest of her family unit, Hamby, 
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and not Jacobson. At the evidentiary hearing Ms. Hamby testified about 
agreeing to send paternity papers into the State (R. 128, 132; Reply 
Brief, A-9 and A-13) in order to put Mr. Jacobson1s name on the child's 
birth certificate as the father (R. 132; Reply Brief, A-13). She testified 
about writing to the State about the name and being told she did not have 
to change the child's birth certificate name in order for him to benefit 
from any Social Security benefits from Mr. Jacobson in the event of 
death. R. 137-138; Reply Brief, A-18-19). 
Respondent's attempt to create an agreement such as present in a clause 
«vCQurt approved A 
of aySSpiirdtion agreement at issue in Gershowitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S. 
2d 356 (1985) (Respondent's Brief at p. 37), is a distortion of the facts. 
Even in yesteryear when courts always found a way to find for the pat-
ronymic as being in the child's "best interests" or as a "right" of the 
father, under the facts of this case it is unlikely that Mr. Jacobson 
could have prevailed in imposing his name on the children he sired with 
Ms. Hamby. This case should not have reached the appellate level; any 
fair minded trial court should have seen the horror of the situation and 
approved the mother's judgment instead of causing her to appeal to a 
higher court. 
Or so the Appellant would hope. The traditional cases of yesteryear, 
and those which follow them, which legal commentators are united in 
criticizing as having made it virtually impossible for divorced/remarried 
women to change their children's names over the objection of their ex-
husbands, seldom involved infant children. This discriminatory caselaw 
involving older children, which Respondent cites throughout his brief 
in support of his position that the children should bear his, rather 
2 
than their mother's name, developed in factual contexts not relevant to 
naming children at birth or when they are very young. See Initial Brief 
at page 26. 
2 
E.g., Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P. 2d 1277(1975); In re Spatz 
258 N.W. Zd 814(Neb.l977); In re Tubbs, 620 P. 2d 384 (Okl. 1980). " ' 
A. Respondent ignores the fact that the trial court did not support 
his conclusions with evidentiary findings" 
Just stating that something is so does not magically make everything 
right in the world. The trial court stated factual conclusions, but no 
facts upon which they were based. The conclusions are not supported by 
the evidence in the case; indeed, they are contrary to it. 
Significantly, the trial court made no finding that Mr. Jacobson 
has/had expressed any interest in the children or, indeed, even seen 
the child born in April, 1985. The trial court's findings were oriented 
only towards perpetuating the patronymic as a general principle. 
To argue that the trial court made genuine findings of fact borders 
on the ludicrous. 
B. The "proffer" of evidence by the parties' lawyers on behalf of 
their clients cannot be considered as record evidence. 
The transcript of the proceedings last October, 1985 has been admitted 
into the record by stipulation since the filing of the Initial Brief. In 
it the lawyers' "proffers" of what their clients would testify to if 
they actually testifed are transcribed. 
Surely, such "proffers" of evidence are not acceptable as actual 
evidence in Utah courts. Appellant knows of no procedural or evidentiary 
authority in Utah or elsewhere that provides that "proffers" of evidence 
by lawyers on behalf of clients without the benefit of clarifying 
questioning or the right of cross examination be admitted into evidence. 
The Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the 
State of Utah and the Fourth Judicial District Court Administrative 
Orders Effecting Procedures and Practice contain none. 
If there is authority for such a practice in Utah, the Supreme Court 
is respectfully asked to articulate it for the benefit of trial court 
practice in Utah. 
Ms. Hamby's actual testimony respecting any alleged agreement over 
the naming of the children conflicts with her counsel's "proffered" 
evidence. The "proffered evidence" should be disregarded. 
C. All the Respondent's derogatory references to Ms. Hamby's 
character, actions and motives, which are not supported by the 
record in this case, should be disregarded by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Throughout its brief the Respondent makes derogatory and misleading 
statements about Kathleen Hamby's character, motives, actions and testimony 
which are not part of the record and which should be disregarded by the 
Supreme Court. 
Ms. Hamby is asking the Supreme Court to disregard the same rather 
than taking the Court's time to consider a Motion to Strike Matter Not 
Included in the Record. 
One page 13 of his brief, the Respondent refers to counsel's "proffer" 
of evidence that "Kathleen's character and behavior was fsic] negative 
also" as if it were fact and evidence of record. This should be disregarded 
One page 36 of his brief, the Respondent states: 
"...it was both prudent and appropriate for the district court to take 
into account the fact that they would have the opportunity (undoubtedly 
heavily influenced by their custodial mother) when they reached an 
age of discretion to initiate a proceeding to change their surname 
'if they wanted to.'" 
Ms. Hamby herself brought up that she would never stand in the way 
of her children changing their names when they are older. R. 140-141; 
Reply, A-21-22. Respondent's parenthetical comment is contrary to the 
actual testimony of Ms. Hamby and impugns her integrity without basis, 
Psrhapsit is projection. 
On page 39 of his brief, Respondent states that "the record reveals 
a punitive motive on the part of Appellant, Kathleen Hamby " because she 
testified that Mr. Jacobson £ by his not working, his drunkedness, his 
violence, etcf] "has put me in a position now to raise three children by 
myself, because it's his choice not to be a husband that I can stay with." 
This accusation of motive should not be accepted. 
One page 40 of his brief the Respondent refers to Ms. Hamby as 
"blaming Mr. Jacobson for physical injury to her middle child." The 
evidence is uncontraverted that Mr. Jacobson caused physical injury to the 
child. Mr. Jacobson's lawyer did not even try to "proffer" evidence that 
he did not. 
On page 40 Respondent also states in parenthesis that Ms. Hamby compared 
Mr. Jacobson to her former husband ("against whom Mr. Jacobson compared 
during his marriage to the Appellant"). 
There is nothing remotely in the record of this case relating to 
whether Ms. Hamby compared Mr. Jacobson to her prior husband any more 
than there is evidence respecting Mr. Jacobson's comparing Ms. Hamby to 
his former wife. Such evidence would be irrelevant anyway. 
These statements on page 40 of Respondent's brief should be disrearded. 
The Respondent further states on page 40 that: 
"It is also noteworthy that when she divorced her former husband, 
she did not insist upon changing the name of the child they had, 
whose custody was awarded to her." 
There is no evidence in the record as to the circumstances of Ms. 
Hamby's first marriage and her reasons for not changing her name after 
her divorce several years ago. As divorce and remarriage become common 
in the United States more and more women are not changing their surnames 
every time they undergo a change in marital status any more than men do not 
In her Initial Brief Appellant cites caselaw involving the right of 
women to not change their names following divorce and remmariage. Many 
women retain names acquired during prior marriages even when they remarry. 
Pearl Buck and Ellen Goodman are but two examples. Respondent's statement 
has no relevance and should be disregarded. 
And, on pages 40-41 Respondent states: 
"Since the surname by which a child should be known after his 
parents' divorce ought not to be resolved on the basis of spite, 
punishment, or animosity, the attitude and statements of the 
Appellant detract from the weight and credibility of her contention 
that the children should bear the surname of her former husband 'Hamby.' 
Such a mischaracterization of Ms. Hamby's testimony is unconscionable 
and should be disregarded. Further, the insulting characterization here 
and elsewhere in his b£%ef of Ms. Hamby?s nam© as her former husband's and 
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not hers, particulatly in light of Ms. Hambyfs affidavit to the Supreme 
Court respecting her name, is a low blow which should be seen for what 
it is and disregarded. 
As if the foregoing assaults on Ms. Hambyfs character were not enough, 
Respondent claims on page 41 that: 
"the controversy arises because the custodial mother wants to 
terminate and cut-off all ties which the noncustodial father 
has with his children." 
From the evidence of record it does not appear that Mr. Jacobson has 
any ties except a few dollars a month of child support. Respondent's 
mischaracterization of Ms. HambyTs intention should be disregarded. 
See, e.g., R. 140; Reply, A-21. 
Adding insult to injury Respondent states on page 41: 
"If the sole question were the best interests of Kathleen Hamby, 
she might arguably persuade the court that the children should 
bear her surname because she would be happier, avenged or so forth." 
This statement should be disregarded. 
On page 34 Respondent claims: 
"Moreover, Ms. Hamby has been known by three different names during 
the past years. She has been married twice, and each time assumed 
the surname of her husband upon marriage. If she should marry a 
third time, there is no reason to believe that she would not assume 
the surname of her third husband upon marriage." 
This statement, in view of Ms. Hambyfs Affidavit in Support of Motion 
For Change of Title of Action, referred to by Respondent in his brief, 
is simply unconscionable. Ms. Hamby has born her surname for at least 
twelve years (her oldest child was eleven at the time of the October, 1985 
proceeding) minus the 10-11 months she lived with Mr. Jacobson. In her 
Affidavit (reproduced in the Addendum to this Reply) she states that 
"I consider it fHambyj my name and I never intend to use any surname 
than Hamby for the duration of my natural life." Reply, A-53-54. 
II. Respondent misunderstands, or miscontstrues,, the custodial 
parent presumption as set forth in the concurring opinion of Justice 
Stanley Mosk in In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 
Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980). The presumption provides a sex-neutral means 
by which courts can apply the standard of the "best interests of the child. 
Respondent does not appear to understand the presumption as articulated 
by the nationally distinguished Justice Mosk. Respondent writes: 
"the leading authority cited for her proposition is a concurring 
opinion of one justice stating what he thought the rule should 
be in a case in which the California Supreme Court expressly adopted 
another rule--the best interests of the child standard." at p. 22. 
Respondent first claims that the presumption differs from the best 
interests standard. Second, he claims that the presumption is a "thinly 
disguised attempt at gender discrimination" because 901 of all (pre-
sumbably both marital and nonmarital) children live with their mothers 
in single parent situations, (p. 38). Third, he claims that the pre-
sumption "is a legislative, not a judicial,pdlicy-decision responsibility" 
(page 23). Fourth, with reference to three states which have legislation 
to prevent changes of children's names over the objections of the non-
custodial parent (Indiana, Louisiana and Virginia), he favors such 
legislation over a custodial presumption "as an incentive to make non-
custodial parents Ti.e. fathers!to support and maintain contact with 
their children."(p.24). Fifth, he claims that the custodial parent pre-
sumption would create "a significant obstacle"to parents reaching vol-
untary custody agreements, (p. 24). , 
Respondent's concerns are misplaced. First, the presumption is not 
different from a best interests standard, but is a means to assure the 
same consistent with traditional black letter family law principles that 
the custodial parent, entrusted with the care, custody and control of 
children, acts in children's best interests in all areas of childrearing, 
including the naming of children. 
In the landmark case of In re Schiffman, the California Supreme Court 
became the forerunner in this area of the law in expressly overruling 
all its precedent recognizing the primary right of men to name marital 
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children, caselaw which had developed in the familar context of children 
who were originally given the paternal name, and adopted the Mbest in-
terestsM standards for resolving disputes over children's names. Justice 
Mosk concurred in this opinion and, in an opinion of high scholarship 
which has been received favorably by law review commentary and highly 
respected, if not expressly adopted by courts , set forth a means by 
to apply the best interests standard: 
"Thus it would seem that a parent deemed fit to have custody ordinarily 
should be deemed fit to select a name that accords with the child's 
best interest...The abrogation of the father's 'primary right' to have 
the child bear his surname in California-as provided in the majority 
opinion-requires that a genuine 'best interest' standard be implemented. 
A rebuttable presumption in favor of the custodial parent's choice of 
name-when custody is in the mother-would accord due weight to the 
following factors which her£ofore have often been subordinated to 
the father's interest at the possible expense of the child's welfare: 
1) embarrassment to the child when he bears a surname different from 
that of the parent with whom he resides; 2) identification of the 
child as part of the current family unit, 3) support of the mother-
child relationship in cases in which the custodial mother uses her 
birth or previous surname." (emphasis added). 
Second, Respondent evidences little knowledge of the principles of 
gender discrimination in claiming that the custodial parent presumption 
would constitute such. The mere fact that a facially sex-neutral provision 
will affect more members of one sex than the other does not constitute 
gender discrimination. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 
(1979). Men can and do seek and win custody. The Utah Legislature 
abolished the "tender years doctrine" which favored women in obtaining 
custody in 1977. See Initial Brief at p. 33. 
In Polikoff, "Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria 
Used in Child Custody Determinations," 7 Women's Rights Law Reporter 235, 
236 (1982) the 90% statistic cited by Respondent is explained: 
"The frequently cited statistic that 90% of all children of divorce 
are in the custody of their mothers is not evidence of unfairness within 
the legal system toward men. In the vast majority of cases, the 
fathers do not want custody and the children remain with the mother 
by parental choice. When fathers do want custody, their chances of 
winning are substantial. While little hard-core data exist, the 
statistics that have been gathered do not support the claims of the 
'fathers' rights' movement. Lenore J. Weitzman and Ruth B. Dixon 
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found in a study limited to Los Angeles County that in 1977, 63 % of 
all fathers who requested custody in court papers were successful. 
A study of 196 Minneapolis cases showed fathers winning 45% of the 
time.. One New York family court judge awarded custody to men as 
often as to women during a five-year period in the 1970s. Two re-
searchers who surveyed North Carolina judges in 1979 found that 
fathers prevailed in almost one-half of the cases. The Legal Aid 
Society of Alameda County, California, reports that of thirteen 
contested custody trials in 1979, fathers prevailed 38% of the time. 
Furthermore, reports from attorneys and analysis of written court 
opinions reveal that the fathers who are winning have not been ex-
ceptionally involved in childrearing prior to divorce."(footnotes omitte 
Years ago, before the demise of the tender years presumption, the 
argument that the custodial parent presumption would constitute gender 
discrimination might have had validity. It no longer does. Further, the 
presumption is being advocated herein for determining the names of infant 
or very young children, children who have not grown up with their 
fathers1 names. 
Third, Respondent misleadingly cites "The Right of Women To Name 
Their Children" among other things, to support its contention that the 
adoption of the presumption is a legislative function and not for the 
courts. 
At the October 24, 1985 proceeding the trial judge stated on the 
record to the parties "as I indicated to counsel in chambers, it is a 
case in which I need your assistance." Respondent's Brief at A-10. 
Trial courts across the nation need the same help. It is a physical 
impossibility for all children's names cases to be well litigated. As is 
the case with many legal reforms, improvements in the law in the naming 
of children can be effectuated by several means, including judicial, leg-
islative and administrative action and/or a combination of the same. In 
Utah,for example, the Department of Health has proposed new regulations 
which will provide for the custodial parent to name newborns in cases of 
parental disagreement. The proposal is reproduced in the Addendum of this 
Reply a A-35-37. 
Fourth, Respondent's favorable reference to name change 
statutes, although not unexpected, contrary to the custodial parent 
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presumption as a 1980s means for resolving disputes over infant children, are 
a condonation of blatant, intentional gender discrimination. The Indiana 
statute, for example, was enacted to protect the changing of older 
children's names. See Senate Bill No. 81 and letter respecting the 
bill from Appellant's counsel to Lesley DuVall, Chair, Senate Judiciary 
Committe, State of Indiana, March 5, 1979. Several years down the line, 
after initial naming rights are sex-neutral, such statutes will be less 
objectionable. As they are today, they provide veto power to divorced 
husbands over the changing of children's names following divorce irrespecti\ 
of the children's best interests. Noncustodial parents in all other aspects 
of childrearing are not presumed to act in their children's best interests 
over the nustodial parents. Custodial parents are specifically entrusted 
with the responsibility of so acting as the parents better fit to make 
childrearing decisions. 
Fifth, Respondent's claim that adoption of the presumption will 
serve as an obstacle to voluntary custody agreements is puzzling. The 
presumption will discourage litigation over children's names perhaps, 
and hopefully eliminate children's names as a negotiable item to be used 
in exchange for greater child support. If the presumption will cause 
men who should seek custody to do so, then it will serve an added function. 
i sugpe.stinp- that ^ 
Is Respondent Y^611 who wish to brand their children but not to really 
assume day to day custodial care of them willfile fraudulent custody 
actions to strong arm custodial mothers into giving up the names issue 
if the presumption is adopted? 
It is submitted that Respondent avoids stating his real opposition to 
the custodial parent presumption: the fear that it will — as it should — 
wipe out the heretofore rarely challenged male right to control the 
naming of marital children.Under the guise of a "best interests" standard 
or with express deference to the male"rightM to control the naming of 
marital children, men have assumed the right to name their marital 
children as long as they maintain some minimal contact with them. 
III. Respondent ignores the trend of the nation's courts, agencies 
and legislatures to approve the custodial parent's choice of name 
in cases involving the naming of children at birth or when they are 
very young, and erroneously uses caselaw developed to prevent the 
changing of names of older children (who were originally given their 
fathers' names and who lived with both parents for a substantial 
period of time), to support a requirement that the infant children 
in this case bear the paternal name. 
Respondent ignores almost all the recent caselaw over the naming 
of infant marital and nonmarital children. Since 1979, except in a 
3 
few cases, pursuant to a variety of theories, courts have found for 
the custodial mother in disputes over naming infant children. See, 
Aiken County Family Agency and Charlene DeVonne Evelyn Hoglund v. 
Frank Lee Girard, No. C7-86-283, Minnesota Court of Appeals (July 23, 
1986)(reproduced in the Addendum to this Reply at A-44-A-52); Bell v. 
Bell, A.D. 2d (N.Y. 1986); Blasi v. Blasi, 648 S.W. 2d 80(Ky. 1983); 
Hurta v. Hurta, 25 Wash. App. 95, 605 P. 2d 1278(1979); Jacobs v. 
Jacobs, 309 N.W. 2d 303 (Minn. 1981); G.L.A. v. T.B.S., 430 N.E. 2d 
433 (Ind. App. 1982); In re M.L.P. , 621 P. 2d 43Q (Tex^Ciyl App. 
1981); In re Nguyen, 684 P. 2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), cert, denied, 
105 S. Ct. 785(1985); In re Goldstein, 104 A.D. 2d 616, 479 N.Y.S. 2d 
385 (1984); Rossell by Yacono,196 N.J. Super. 109 (1984); In re 
Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980); 
In re Schidlmeier, 496 A. 2d 1249 (Pa. Super. 1985) ( Appeal denied, 
January 21, 1986). See also,State v. Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d 485, 421 
N.Y.S. 2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
And in Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W. 2d 381 (1982) the 
Nebraska Supreme Court attempted to provide a compromise in a dispute 
involving the interpretation of that state's name selection statute, 
by imposing a hyphenated name on a newborn. 
Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A. 303 fMd r+ o 
(i^TT^^T^^ ' Ct-sP^-APP. 
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This body of law is, however, in striking contrast to the caselaw 
involving the changes of older children's names. 
In a recent case, Aiken County v. Girard, supra, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals interpreted the case of In re Saxton, 309 N.W. 2d 
298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034(1982) in a case in-
volving two (nonmarital) children, ages four and five whose father had, 
the parties agreed,''established a positive and loving relationship with 
the children." The Court adopted a degree of the custodial parent pre-
sumption in deciding for the custodial mother: 
"absent evidence that the change will be detrimental to the pre-
servation of the children's relationship with their father, we see 
no reason to put aside the preference expressed by their custodial 
parent, the children's mother. It is in the best interest of such 
young children to provide them with stability and continuity...The 
preservation of the family unit as they have always known it, in-
cluding having the same name as their custodial parent, is an element 
of that continuity. Appellant has been and continues to be primarily 
responsible for the welfare of the children.Under these circumstances, 
the evidence does not show that the substantial welfare of the 
children necessitates a change of name." Reply at A-6-7. 
In Cohee v. Cohee, supra, the Nebraska Supreme Court accepted 
custody as a factor to be considered. 
And in Application of Rossell by Yacono, supra, the Superior Court of 
New Jersey wrote, in awarding the right of a divorced custodial mother 
to change the surname of her young son from the paternal to her birth 
given surname, in a case similar to the instant one: 
"The emergence of women as equals of men in our society may be our 
most significant revolution. The acceptance of that emergence is 
grudgingly slow: it is an acceptance which the courts must not 
impede...The child is less than two years old. He has lived with 
his mother almost exclusively since birth. He is too young to have 
achieved any significant identification with his last name. His 
father's interest in his welfare has been so modest as to be non-
existent. His father's behavior while married to his mother ex-
hibited little regard for the loving and considerate treatment 
which children have a right to expect from their father and he 
has provided no proof that his behavior has changed. Under the 
circumstances, Joseph Michael Thomas Rossell will be better served 
in this life if he carries his mother's name." at 115-116. 
Under traditional caselaw--that developed to prevent older children's 
names from being changed over the objection of their fathers--the 
mother had to rebut the virtually irrebuttable presumption that the 
children's names should not be changed from the patronymic. If the 
mother claimed that the children would be embarrassed by continuing to 
bear the paternal name it was her responsibility--with an impossible 
burden of proof--to show exceptional circumstances. On page 34 of his 
brief Respondent states MIn this case there was no evidence of any 
exceptional circumstances" following his citation of cases involving 
older children who had originally been given their fathers1 names 
and lived with both parents under the same name as a family unit. 
The application of these old standards, including the burden of 
proof they impose on the mother, are misplaced. 
IV. Respondent's position that, if a mother's name is acquired from 
a previous marriage, her children who are not fathered by her ex-
husband should not bear the same name as a matter of policy, is contrary 
to Utah law, the common law, the Constitution of the United States 
and the standard of the "best interests of the child." 
On page 25 of his brief Respondent refers to the fact that"Mr. 
Jacobson did not object to his wife resuming the use of the surname 
'Hamby,'" as if he had any right to. See, e.g., In re Banks, 4 2 Cal. 
App. 3d 631, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37(1974); Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J. Super. 
403, 337 A. 2d 46 (1975); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich. App. 
213, 247 N.W. 2d 354(1976); Wetcker v. Wetfcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. 
App. 1977); Cowley v. Cowley, A.C. 450(1901). He continually refers 
to Ms. Hamby'sya!?^11 the surname of her prior husband" (e. g. ,p. 29) 
instead of as her name(which she assumed during a prior marriage). 
He refers, on page 43, to Ms. Hamby's^eeking to name her children with 
"the surname of one of her previous husbands" as if she has had numerous 
-25-
marriages and, again, in derogation of her having her own name. 
He argues that the name MJacobsonn will link the children with 
one of the two families from which they are descended and that 
"Hamby" will not. 
The Respondent's contentions are puzzling. "Hamby" is the 
children's mother's name. She is linked to her mother and father iy-
ythe name^ 
respective laffshe uses. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. 
Hamby's mother took Ms. Hamby's father's surname or that the name 
Ms. Hamby bore before her first marriage was that of either her mother 
or father. Presumably it was. 
Any lawyer who has done a title search realizes that family des-
cendants bear numerous surnames. Respondent's argument that children 
should not use a surname not originally borne by either of its 
parents is a policy argument. Even if the Utah Legislature were to 
enact a children's names law, however, under the common law and the 
4 
Constitution of the United States, parents have the right to name 
their children as they please. Limiting the names parents could give 
their children would be patently unlawful. See cases cited, supra, 
page 9£and Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
The standard of the "best interests of the child" does not by 
definition allow for a limitation on the name which may be in a child's 
best interests. Ms. Hamby wants her children to bear the same name 
as the rest of her household>including herself. 
4 
Amendment XIV, section 1 
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Conclusion 
For the reasons stated herein and in her Initial Brief, the 
Appellant Kathleen Hamby asks that the Order and Ruling of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court be reversed and her two children fathered by 
her ex-husband be given her surname, Hamby. The Appellant also requests 
that in its Order to such effect, the Supreme Court of Utah give clear 
direction to trial courts of the state for a method for resolving 
disputes between custodial and noncustodial parents of newborn, infant 
or very young children consisten^with the custodial parent's authority 
to direct the upbringing of children in accordance with their best in-
terests. 
Ms. Hamby asks that such an Order be made following oral argument 
on the issues raised herein. 
Dated this 22 day of August, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Priscilla Ruth 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN JACOBSON and STATE OF 
UTAH, by and through Utah State 
Department of Social Services, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GAIL JACOBSON, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 67957 
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled 
matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on 
the 14th day of March, 1985, commencing at the hour of 9:25 
o'clock a.m., at Room 310, County Building, Provo, Utah; 
That there appeared as counsel represen-
ting the Plaintiff Kathleen Jacobson, DONALD E. ELKINS, ESQ., 
and as counsel represending the Plaintiff State of Utah, 
RAY E. GAMMON, ESQ., and that there appeared as counsel 
representing the Defendant, RICHARD M. TAYLOR, ESQ. 
WHEREFORE, the following proceedings 
were had: 
THE COURT: No. 67957, Jacobson vs. 
EDWARD V. QUIST, CSR A-* > \j.U 
INDEX OF WITNESSES 
KATHLEEN JACOBSON: D-6, C-19. 
GAYLON L. DOWNEY: D-22, C-26. 
plaintiff rests - 27. 
INDEX OF EXHIBITS 
iden. rec'd 
P-l 17 18 
A-3L j 0-1 1-a 
Jacobson. 
of the plaintiff. 
MR. ELKINS: I'm Don Elkins, on behalf 
THE COURT: Ready to proceed? 
MR. ELKINS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed, 
Mr. Taylor? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want to briefly tell 
me what it's all about? 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, this is a 
divorce matter and has turned into essentially a default 
divorce, but there is one area of contention between the 
two parties. There is a stipulation now on file that dis-
poses of the property settlement, child custody, that type 
of thing. It's a little unusual in that the matter they are 
disputing, I'm not sure there a definite statement anywhere 
in Utah law of how the things to be decided. That's the 
reason we'd like the Court to listen to it. 
What the dispute centers around is whether or not 
one child that is the natural child of the plaintiff and the 
defendant, although born before this marriage, and one other 
child that's due to be born in about four weeks shall bear 
the surname of the plaintiff or the defendant. The child 
that was born before the marriage now bears the surname of 
#~3 p > 2 
the plaintiff and she wants that situation to continue with 
the new child also. The defendant, the father, wants both 
Children to bear his last name. 
The plaintiff would like the opportunity in 
addition to stating her gounds for the divorce to explain 
to the Court why she wants that name to be as it is now, 
and why she wants the new child also to bear her name. 
That's where we stand. 
MR. TAYLOR: May it please the Court: 
The defendant is an unemployed miner who called 
me about a week ago and indicated that he had a chance to 
go out of state for a few days work and, therefore, it would 
be inconvenient for him and difficult for him to be here at 
this hearing. I called Mr. Elkins and advised him of this, 
told him that rather than delay the matter I would not file 
an application for vacation of trial setting if the only 
issue to be reserved would be the question of this name 
change. And Mr. Elkins indicated that was agreeable and 
that if the Court, after hearing the plaintiff's represen-
tations, would not deny the motion, then Mr. Elkins agrees 
that we may stipulate and join in the motion to the Court 
that the case may be continued just to hear his response at 
a time when he's available. He's been unemployed all winter, 
and told me that if he passed this opportunity up he'd go 
to the bottom of the board, something to do with the union, 
A-* p 3 3 
and he was very upset about the difficult that this appearing 
today and testifying would create for him. 
So, that's our posture, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, he says that the law 
provides for changing of a name. Isn't there some law, 
however, that provides what will and what will not be a 
legal name of a person? 
MR. TAYLOR: The common law is that the 
father who is, ordinarily, would object has a right to haVe 
the name remain with him, his own name, have the children 
bear his own name, unless there's an overriding benefit. 
THE COURT: Is that what the law is, 
unless there's an overriding consideration? 
MR. TAYLOR: If there's a consideration 
which would be --
THE COURT: Does it have to be public, 
or is it --
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, it would have to be 
for the benefit of the children. 
THE COURT: Oh. Well, I meant overriding 
public considerations? 
MR. TAYLOR: No. I didn't finish my 
sentence. If there's an overriding reason why it's for the 
children's benefit, the name change can be made. I can 
conceive in a situation if someone had a notorious name, for 
/>-> \ 2 H 4 
example --
THE COURT: Well, you can do that by 
simply following the procedure for a change of name. 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, I might point 
out here: There is no change of name, your Honor. The one 
child in existence has the name Hamby on the birth certifi-
cate, which she wants, which has been born. The new child 
has no name. We are arguing about whether the new child 
here has to be named Jacobson and whether that new child 
should have that name based on the birth certificate. We 
have a letter from the State of Utah, in fact, it says the 
name on the birth certificate should be the name both parents 
agree upon, which would tend to show that there isn't a 
definite way one way or another of what the name would be, 
it's just that the two parties should agree on what name 
they place on that certificate. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't we 
get the evidence in and then if you want to move for a 
continuance or something, we'll take that up at the time. 
MR. TAYLOR: My point, my procedure 
would be, your Honor: If at the conclusion of her evidence 
the Court is unwilling to rule at that time that she is not 
entitled to what she would ask for, then we would ask for a 
continuance to allow him to present his view. 
fl~(s P " 5 
THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 
MR. ELKINS: All right. Thank you. 
Mrs. Jacobson, would you stand here and be sworn? 
KATHLEEN JACOBSON, having been called as 
a witness, being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ELKINS: 
Q Mrs. Jacobson, could you please state your full 
name and address, for the record? 
A Yes. My name's Kathy Jacobson. I live at 45 East 
100 -- 200 South, in Goshen. 
Q And are you the plaintiff in this matter that's 
before the Court this morning? 
A Yes. 
Q And when were you married to Mr. Jacobson, the 
defendant? 
A November 29th of '83. 
Q And Mrs. Jacobson, were you a resident of Utah 
County for more than three months prior to the time that this 
Complaint was filed? 
A Thirteen years. 
Q Your Complaint states that your husband treated 
you cruelly, causing you great mental distress. Could you 
tell the Court what you mean by that? What did your husband 
do that made you want the divorce? 
$,n ,iu 6 
A Well, he's verbally abusive, he's physically 
abusive, and he's abusive to all of the children in our 
He's < a. drunk. 
home. 
He's drunk more often than he's sober. And 
he wouldn't work. 
Q 
that : 
A 
Q 
Were these continuing problems throughout the 
you were 
Yes, 
All 
separate? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
prior 
A 
Q 
A 
married to Mr. Jacobson? 
they were. 
right. And when did you and Mr. Jacobson 
October 20th. 
Of 1984? 
Urn-hum. (Yes) 
You 
married 
Yes 
time 
told me that you want to resume use of your 
name, Hamby; is that correct? 
, it is. 
Do you have any children that now have that name? 
Yes, I do. I have a ten-year-old son from my 
marriage whose name is Hamby, and I have a 21-month-old 
whose 
Hamby 
and I 
Q 
born, 
name is 
? 
Hamby. 
THE COURT: How did he get the name 
first 
son 
of 
THE WITNESS: He was born out of wedlock, 
gave him the name that I carried then. 
(By 
did you 
Mr. Elkins) At the time that that child was 1 
have plans to marry Mr. Jacobson? 
A-r \* 7 
1 A No, I didn't. 
2 Q After you were married did you ever discuss with 
3 Mr. Jacobson the matter of changing the name of that child 
4 from Hamby to Jacobson? 
5 A When we were talking about getting married, that 
6 was one of the ideas to marry was to give this baby a home 
7 and stable family conditions. After we were married it was 
8 never even brought up till about June he said I should send 
9 for the papers. When I got them I filled them out and told 
10 him that all that needed to be done was have them notorized 
11 and that I'd leave that up to him when he wanted to do it, 
12 and he never did until, I think it was the 2nd of October 
13 when he demanded that we sign it, which at the time I already 
14 had told him I was leaving him. And I think he did that to 
15 have some kind of a foothold. But I still felt that for my 
16 child's sake it was the thing to do and I went ahead and 
17 signed them, but I didn't send them into the State because 
18 I was too confused as to whether I should give him that kind 
19 of a right to a child that he had been abusive towards, and 
20 he's hurt that baby. He's hit him in the head with a board. 
21 The baby's lost the upward motion in his left eye. 
22 Q Has the baby received medical treatment because of 
23 that? 
24 A Yes, he has. There's no treatment, though. He's 
25 had two specialists look at him. 
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Q Mrs. Hamby, on file in this matter is a document 
called a Stipulation -- excuse me -- Mrs. Jacobson, that 
you and the defendant Gail Jacobson both executed along with 
your attorneys. Did you enter into that of your own free 
will? 
A Yes. 
Q It seems that Stipulation takes care of most of 
the matters that the divorce hearing ordinarily would take 
care of, but paragraph 10 bring up the question of the name 
of the children. Can you explain to me why you donft want 
the child that you currently have with Mr. Jacobson and the 
child that's to be born to have Mr. Jacobsonfs name? 
A Yes, I could. 
THE COURT: There's no -- Before she 
answers that question: I don't know that I can do anything 
about the child of the parties born, can I, in this proceed-
ing? 
MR. ELKINS: I don't think you can, your 
Honor. I think that if Mr. Jacobson wanted to change the 
name from Hamby, he would have to --
MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I would like 
to be heard on that. I didn't respond when your Honor ~ 
THE COURT: Well, you can be heard on 
the question of what can I do with regard to the child that's 
already been born. 
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MR. TAYLOR: Do you want me to speak 
to that now? 
THE COURT; Yes, in this proceeding. I 
know what I can do in an appropriate application for a name 
change. 
MR. TAYLOR: The child which has already 
been born, your Honor, is the child of the defendant. 
THE COURT: Well, but this is an action 
for divorce. 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, it's not an 
action to change names; and a child already in existence is, 
the law provides, common law or otherwise, and the parties 
have done whatever they have done --
MR. TAYLOR: That's correct. 
THE COURT: -- with respect to names. 
MR. TAYLOR: They have married and in 
effect legitimized the child. 
THE COURT: Yes. But do I have that 
question before me? It's foreign to this divorce decree, 
isn't it? 
MR. TAYLOR: The child before the Court, 
because the support for the child before the Court and the 
legitimacy of the child, I think the child has been legiti-
mized by the parents and by acknowledgment of both parties, 
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that the child is, at the child's age, in that event it's 
just as if the child was born and conceived after wedlock. 
So if she chooses to call the child Hamby, I don't think 
that that would preclude the Court from ordering at this 
time that this is common law right to have the child to bear 
his name if he's going to be ordered to support and be 
determined to be the father of the child, thereby compromi-
zed --
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, we do have an 
exhibit that may be placed here in the record here that may 
help the Court decide, at least what the policy of the 
State of Utah would be towards that. 
THE COURT: She may --As the question 
that you asked her. 
Q (By Mr. Elkins) Mrs. Hamby, can you tell me why 
you don't want Mr. Jacobson's name attached to the child 
that's already been born to the two of you and the child 
that's going to be born to you? 
A Yes. I have a lot of reasons. The main one is 
for, are for the benefit of the children. If the children 
don't have the same last name in the family I feel that it 
makes more insecurity, less family closeness. Mr. Jacobson 
has put me in a position now to raise three children by 
myself, because it's his choice not to be a husband that 
I can stay with. And when I have to raise three children 
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I need the best circumstances to raise those kids under that'q 
possible; and I feel that having my whole family have the 
same last name brings the family closer together, there will 
be a lot less questions brought up at an earlier date for 
those little babies. They won't be wondering why their 
name is different until they are old enough to discuss it, 
I'd also like to tell you that where I hadn't sent 
the paper in and even put Mr. Jacobson on Kelly's birth 
certificate, I've agreed to do that, I've agreed to put his 
name on the birth certificate of the born child and have the 
unborn child when it's born. 
THE COURT: When are you expecting this 
child to be born that you are carrying? 
THE WITNESS: Within four weeks. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: And I feel that they should 
have their father's name on the birth certificate. That's 
for the children's sake. 
Q (By Mr. Elkins) You are speaking of, as the father 
of the child? 
A As the father stated in the place where it says 
"father," to say that Gail Jacobson is the father, so that 
the children see a father there on their birth certificate. 
And I feel that that's a moral decision that I've already 
made, but the last name is what --
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Q Mrs. Jacobson, let me interrupt. Have you sought 
any professional advise on any affect of the children having 
different names? 
A Yes, I have. I have Mr. Downey here today, who is 
a school psychologist. I've talked to a lot of people about 
it. I was, also, raised in a broken home with a different 
last name and saw the affects of it. Even when you are 
happy in a broken home, when you come home with a child as 
a friend and you introduce your mother with a different name, 
your friend asks you: why does your mother have a different 
name, is she really your mother, or things like that. And, 
so that kids begin to wonder who their mother and father is. 
And I feel that it's just the security on the children. It's 
not an issue here I'm here to argue about to hurt Gail 
Jacobson or anything else. His name does carry around a 
stigma. 
MR. TAYLOR: We object to that, your Honoij 
THE COURT: Her testimony may remain. 
A It's just that he, we live in a small town, a very 
small town, his home and my home are two blocks apart, and 
he has always been known as a drinker and a fighter in town. 
His mother told me that when I tried to tell her and --
Q (By Mr. Elkins) Well, you can't testify as to 
what someone told you. 
Q Oh, okay. 
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Q Do you have personal knowledge of this reputation 
you are speaking of Mr, Jacobson? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q How do you have that personal knowledge? 
A I've lived in that town for six years. 
Q Have you ever heard of anyone, without naming 
names or specific conversations, say the types of things 
about Mr. Jacobson that you have just portrayed to the Court? 
MR. TAYLOR: We'd object to this, your 
Honor, as calling for hearsay. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess she can testify 
about reputation from her own knowledge, and it would have 
to be based on what she's heard. 
A Yes. I have heard a lot of people say things. And 
mostly they said them after I left him. 
Q (By Mr. Elkins) All right. 
A I knew that he had been married just prior to 
being married to me, and another woman had to divorce him 
within a year of marriage. And she was pregnant, too. 
THE COURT: That may go out. 
MR. ELKINS: That may be stricken. 
Q (By Mr. Elkins) Now, Mrs. Jacobson, as to the 
remaining portions of the stipulation that you have entered 
into are you willing to abide by the amounts that are con-
tained in there as to property settlement and child support 
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and that type of thing? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q The stipulation calls for eighty dollars per month 
per child child support. Can you tell us what that was 
based upon? 
A That was based on the fact that I need to get this 
settled and over with. 
Q But to your knowledge was Mr. Jacobson employed at 
the time that you entered into this? 
A Yes. Mr. Jacobson will be employed as long as he 
chooses to be. 
Q Mrs. Jacobson, you told me that one item in the 
stipulation that calls for you to return to Mr. Jacobson 
certain bedroom drapes and two old knives which were his 
property. Have you been able to locate those items as yet? 
A There's some old drapes and curtain rods, but I 
don't know of anything about the knives. 
Q If you can locate the knives are you willing to 
return those at the earliest possible time? 
A Oh, sure. 
Q Have you moved -- You've moved recently from the 
house that you occupied with Mr. Jacobson? 
A October 20th. 
Q So was any -- Have you unpacked everything in your 
new location? 
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A Well, I hadn't--It was in my basement, but my 
basement flooded Thursday, so I'm in the process of dragging 
things around and trying to find them. If they are there, 
I'll find them and return them. But I don't believe that I 
do even have them. 
Q Mrs. Jacobson, do you have any request to make 
to the Court with regard to the three-month interlocutory 
period that's called for by Utah law after this divorce is 
granted? 
A Yes, I certainly do. I'm going to have this child, 
and I'm begging the Court to make the divorce final today 
so that I can have this baby. I've suffered this pregnancy 
the whole time facing this divorce, and his family has given 
me a bad time in town. And I feel that the sooner that the 
divorce is made final, the sooner they'll leave me alone. 
I'd like to be able to nurse my baby and settle down and 
have a few weeks peace of mind before the baby gets here 
without this hanging over us. 
MR. ELKINS: And, your Honor, on file 
in this matter is the letter from Mrs. Jacobson's doctor 
that's indicated that because of some difficulty that she 
has had with the pregnancy, that he recommends that it be 
gotten over as quickly as possible. 
MR. TAYLOR; We have no objection. 
MR. ELKINS: I would like the Court to 
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take note of that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELKINS: Could I have this marked 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1? 
THE COURT: With respect to the child 
that is already born, do you say that child is 21 months 
old? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And what's the child's name 
on the birth certificate? 
THE WITNESS: On his birth certificate, 
Kelly Lynn Hamby. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, we have that 
birth certificate, if the Court would like to see it. 
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I also feel — 
THE COURT: Just a minute. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, if I might, 
the birth certificate of Kelly. (handing to the Court) 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Elkins) Mrs. Hamby, I have a letter here 
that I have had marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. It's 
a letterhead from the State of Utah Department of Health and 
addressed to Kathy Jacobson, Goshen, Utah. Would you please 
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tell me that and tell me if you recognize it? 
A Yes. It's a letter, when I first separated, when 
I was trying to find out what I was to do, to find out if 
I didn't put Mr. Jacobson's name on the birth certificate 
at all, if Kelly could still have social security benefits 
if anything happened to Mr. Jacobson. And they sent this 
plus a booklet of the laws in the different states. And it 
states that as long as we were married --
Q That's right, Mrs. Jacobson, the letter will 
explain. 
A Okay. 
Q But does the letter at least explain to you what 
the policy for the State of Utah is with regard to having 
the name for Kelly changed? 
A Yes, it does. There's no need. 
Q Okay. 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, we'd like to 
introduce Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 into evidence. 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, we want to --
THE COURT: I think I'm going to read it, 
anyway. 
your Honor. 
MR. TAYLOR: I think it's immaterial, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, that's all I 
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have for Mrs. Jacobson at this time. 
THE COURT: All right. You may step 
down. 
Honor? 
you may. 
MR. TAYLOR: May I cross examine, your 
THE COURT: Oh, excuse me. Certainly, 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. TAYLOR: 
Q Mrs. Jacobson, Gail Jacobson is the father of 
the child which is now born, is he not? 
A Yes. 
Q No question about that in your mind? 
A No. 
Q And you are anxious that the child receive all the 
benefits of that fatherhood, are you not, that is, social 
security in the event Mr. Jacobson should die, all of the 
benefits which may be available by reason of any federal 
entitlement through Social Security? Is that not correct? 
A I don't know anything about the federal. 
Q Well, I'm talking about just social security. If 
Gail should die you'd want your son to receive that benefit, 
wouldn't you? 
A Yes, I would. 
Q And also there are other benefits that the child 
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may receive by having some attention of it's father, is 
that not true, such as whatever association or fcomfort the 
child may have? 
A No, sir. I donft feel there's anything like that. 
Q So you don't want Gail to have any association 
with the child at all? 
A He hasn't had any these months I have been gone. 
Q All right. Now, but you don't want him to have 
any in the future; is that what you are saying to the Coutt? 
A I'm hoping he doesn't. 
Q You don't want Gail to visit with the child or 
have any association with him? 
A I'm hoping he doesn't. 
Q And yet you want him to support the child and be 
a father to him for all of the benefits that may give to 
the child, but you don't want any of the benefits to come to 
the child by any association with Gail. Is that right? 
A I would love him to have benefits by association, 
if there are any present. There aren't any. 
Q You've made this decision forever and ever? 
A No, I haven't. And as far as the name goes, I 
still like, as the children are babies, they should have 
the same family name. And where he is on the birth certifi-
cate and will be put on Kelly's birth certificate, which 
I've agreed to as the children get older, if they make the 
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decision that they want their father's name, if he has been 
coming around and seeing them and being a father to them, I 
would never object to my children having their way when they 
are old enough to make a decision like that, 
Q But you want to make that decision for them now? 
A Yes, I do. I have custody of them, and I'm their 
mother. 
MR. TAYLOR: That's all, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, now, you may step 
down. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, we have one 
other witness that we would like to call, the Nebo School 
psychologist that Mrs. Jacobson has consulted about the 
affect of the children having different names; that he has 
some interesting things that he might say that relate to 
this case. If we could ask him a few questions, we'd 
appreciate it. 
THE COU&T: I don't know whether I'm 
going to let that become an issue or not. 
MR. TAYLOR: I have some law on the matteif 
your Honor, I'd like to be heard and at the appropriate time 
THE COURT: Do you have an objection to 
this witness testifying? 
MR. TAYLOR: I suppose not. 
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THE COURT: Okay, call him. 
MR. ELKINS: Mr. Downey, will you come 
forward. 
GAYLON L. DOWNEY, having been called as 
a witness, being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ELKINS: 
Q Would you please state your full name and address, 
for the record? 
A My name is Gaylon Lester Downing. I live at 
1627 South 400 West, in Orem. 
Q And, Mr. Downing, where are you employed, currently^ 
A Ifm employed in Payson, Utah for Nebo School 
District. 
Q What is your job there? 
A I'm a school psychologist. 
Q How long have you had that job? 
A This is my eighth year. 
Q And, Mr. Downing, could you please tell the Court 
about your educational background, where you went to school? 
A I went to BYU, got my bachelors and masters at 
BYU, bachelors in psychology and masters in psychology. 
Q And when did you graduate with your masters? 
A 1977. 
Q Mr. Downing, could you please tell the Court just 
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what your job with Nebo School District entails? 
A I do testing and evaluations for children in 
special education programs, resource class as well as con-
sulting with parents, teachers, principals, counseling with 
students or in group therapy sessions, group counseling, 
that type of thing. 
Q Mr. Downing, you have been present throughout the 
course of this proceeding this morning so far. Has you had 
occasion prior to this day to talk with Mrs. Jacobson about 
this case? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q Are you familiar with the details of this parti-
cular matter? 
A Yes. 
Jacobson? 
three years 
anything to 
since I 
do with 
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: Not recently, no. 
Have you ever? 
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: This has probably been 
him. 
Okay. It wouldn't have had 
either of these children? 
THE WITNESS : No. It was his older 
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children. 
THE COURT: I see. Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Elkins) You've heard, I hope, what we 
have been talking about with regard to names and children. 
Do you have any background at all in the problem of whether 
or not children from a divorce should have the parents, 
either father or the mother's, name? 
A Professional experience in working with kids 
that I've counseled with who are going through divorces of 
whose parents have gone through divorces, and they have been 
in that kind of situation where they have been placed in 
chosing a name or deciding which name they'd like to have for 
themselves; and sometimes you can change in that type of 
personal involvement, yes. 
Q Perhaps that question wasn't as direct as I -- If 
I can rephrase it and see what I'm getting at here: Do you 
have any experience with cases where children within a 
family have had different last names? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q Do you have any opinions about the affects of that 
situation? 
A Yes. Where they come from a family that has two 
different names, it disrupts somewhat the identity they 
have with themselves and also with the family. A big part 
of what a child feels himself to be is linked to the immediate! 
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family they are involved with. And when a child can say 
well, we are the foundation or we are this family, it helps 
provide, essentially, unity in the family and something they 
belong to. Where if there's two names, it provides some 
kind of division in that unity that they are faced with 
whenever they fill out an application and whenever they 
state their name in class. That kind of thing raises a 
lot of questions continuing in their minds. And in a refer-
ence with the unity that's involved in a family, that 
provides a lot of security for a child that is growing up. 
Q In your opinion as one who works in the area of 
child psychology, from what you know about this particular 
case, if after this divorce Mrs. Jacobson were to have one 
name and one or two of her children were to have a different 
name, could you foresee any possible problems that might 
result fro the children? 
MR. TAYLOR: We object to that, your 
Honor. I don't think they have a proper foundation for him 
to give a conclusion on this particular case. I think he 
can speak generally, but he's never talked with the father 
or --
THE COURT: I think that might be true. 
I think he may talk in general terms. 
Q (By Mr. Elkins) Generally, in a case it would be 
similar, if there was a divorce and the mother were to have 
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one name and one or more of the children could have another 
name, do you see any problems that might develop? 
A Possibly, yes. It's never a sure thing because 
there are so many factors involved. But that could be a 
factor, it could hinder a child in their development. 
Q Can you give me an example of what type of problem 
might develop? 
A For example, I've worked with one boy whose parents 
are divorced, and he will go through periods when he's more 
happy with his dad so he'll take on his dad's name, and 
there will be some problems there, and so he'll go move in 
with his mom and he'll take his mom's name. And it will 
create uncertainty in his own mind as to who he is and where 
he is and what he ought to be doing. Because attached to 
that name is also the values that go along with the parent 
who also has that name. 
MR. ELKINS: Thank you, Mr. Downey. 
That's all I have. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. TAYLOR: 
Q You are certainly not advocating in all circum-
stances that the name of the father be changed to that of 
the mother in case of a divorce, are you? 
A I think it should always be considered on an 
individual basis. 
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Q And in this particular case you really can't say 
what Mr, Jacobson1s behavior would be later or whether even 
it's bad now, you don't know that, do you? 
A I can't say for sure what his behavoir has been. 
Q In fact you deal with a great many children in 
families where there are divorces and where the children 
bear two different names? 
A Yes. 
Q And in many of those cases the children are getting 
along well, is that not true? 
A That's true. 
MR. TAYLOR: That's all. 
THE COURT: All right, you may step down. 
MR. ELKINS: That's all the plaintiff 
has, your Honor. 
Tell me what it is. 
THE COURT: You say you have some law. 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. I don't have anything 
in Utah, but American Juris Prudence 57 Am Jur 2d at Section 
4 page 284 is to the effect that it's generally recognized 
that the father who is ordinarily the objecting party has a 
protectable interest in having his child bear the paternal 
surname in accordance with the usual custom, even though the 
mother may have been awarded the custody of the child; and 
for that reason the name, merely to save the mother or the 
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child from inconvenience or embarrassment, won't be authoriz 
ed against the father's objection. 
Now, as I've stated earlier, where there's a sub-
stantial interest and in changing the name and where there's 
a good reason for the benefit of the children, then I think 
the Court does have the power to order it under the common 
law. Now, there are a number of cases cited in the anno-
tations, and all of them seem to support, I couldn't find 
any of the cases where they authorized a change of name, 
they all have denied it. That doesn't mean to say that 
in a proper circumstance or a proper showing a name change 
would be granted. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. TAYLOR: But that's all I have to 
say on it. 
THE COURT: Now, where do you sit in 
this matter -- Oh, excuse me. Did you have something more? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COU&T: Go ahead, then. 
MR. TAYLOR: I'd like to point out that 
I think that the Court's power and responsibility is the same 
with respect to the child which was born out of wedlock but 
which has been acknowledged and accepted into the family as 
though that child were born in wedlock, and that there's no 
real difference. And the mere fact that this lady chose to 
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put the name Hamby on the birth certificate should not pre-
clude the Court from requiring that if this man is going to 
be ordered to support the child, acknowledge paternity, 
accept the responsibility for the child, be given the right 
to visitation and all of the normal things that the father 
has, that merely because the child was born prior to wedlock 
should not preclude the Court from ordering that that child 
bear this man's surname, because he's going to have all of 
the burden of responsibility. 
THE COURT: All right. Where do you sit 
in the matter? 
MR. GAMMON: The mother has received 
some assitance from the State of Utah in the past. The 
defendant or father has paid that money to the State that was 
owing to the State. And so the State then is simply to 
state that we have been paid for all assistance that has been 
provided heretofore. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. This is 
what I'm going to do: 
First of all, we'll grant the plaintiff a decree 
of divorce from and against the defendant on the grounds of 
cruelty; and the divorce will become absolute upon its sign-
ing and entry in the register of actions of the Clerk. And 
it will be based upon the stipulation, that is the relief 
that the agreement, stipulation of the parties, have entered 
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into is approved, and that may be incorporated in the decree. 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ELKINS: Mr. Taylor has agreed with 
me that we might add a mutual restraining order to that 
stipulation, also. 
MR. TAYLOR: We have no objection, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, and that may go 
in, too. 
Now, with respect to the name of the child that's 
here previously born, the, is it Kelly? 
MR. ELKINS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: His name on the official 
records of the State of Utah is, and the record will show 
that the birth certificate has been exhibited to me, is 
Kelly Lynn Hamby. And I will permit a filing in this action, 
if you care to file it, an application for name change; and 
the issue can be raised, joined, at that time. If nothing 
is done with respect to it, there's no further court order; 
the child's name will be as it is upon the records of the Statje 
of Utah at this time, on the birth certificate. 
Now, with respect to the child who is to be born, 
that, the name of that child will also be Jacobson, Jacobson, 
unless there is a petition or application for name change 
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filed in this case. And Ifm doing that solely to keep filing 
costs down. I would normally require it in a separate suit. 
But I'll consider it as though it were filed as an appli-
cation for name change under the statute. In other words, 
I believe that there's something, first of all, I think Kelly 
has the legal name and it would have to be changed and should 
be changed upon the records, under the law, if that's what 
should be done. And the child to be born would have the, 
under the common law, would normally be known as Jacobsoni 
But after birth of that child you can file a petition or an 
application in this case, then I'll consider it as an appli-
cation for --
MR. TAYLOR: The Court didn't indicate 
any time limit on this. We would prefer to wait until the 
birth of the new child and have it all handled at once, if 
that's a --
THE COURT: You can do that, and we'll 
give you 30 days after the child is born. 
MR. TAYLOR: Thirty days after the birth. 
THE COURT: In which to file any appli-
cation for name change. 
Now, you'd have the same right, Mr. Elkins, because J 
and then I can give consideration to the testimony of this 
witness and also her testimony with regard to reasons and so 
on, and then we'll decide that name change at that time. 
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MR. TAYLOR: And I presume we would 
have opportunity then to present testimony. 
THE COURT: Exactly. But the legal 
names of the child will be, against the advise of a profes-
sional, would be Hamby and Jacobson at this juncture. How-
ever, the second child has not been born yet, the one we are 
talking about. And so we'll preserve the issues with respect 
to both until that time. 
MR. ELKINS: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. But the decree of 
divorce, as I indicated, will be final upon entry. The 
names will be the only thing that would be reserved for 
further consideration. 
(WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded at 10:02 
o'clock a.m.) 
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duly registered and licensed to practice in the State of 
Utah; that on the 14th day of March, 1985, I appeared before 
the above-named Court and reported the proceedings had and 
testimony given in the above-entitled cause of action; that 
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 32, inclusive, 
contain a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic 
notes, as taken in the above-entitled hearing, to the best 
of my ability. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this ^J^ day of 
May, 1986. 
Edw^d -V; Quist, CSR 
License No. 71 
310 County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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UTAH 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Suzanne Dandoy, M.D., M.RH. 
Executive Director 
June 16, 1986 
Pricilla MacDougall 
346 Kent Lane 
Madison, Wisconsin 53713 
Oear Ms. MacDougal: 
This is in response to your telephone request for a copy of our 
guidelines for naming father and surname of child. 
A copy of the guidelines are enclosed, along with a copy of Rule 1.5 and 
Rule 3.4 of our proposed revised Rules (formerly Regulations) for Vital 
Statistics in Utah. I believe that with these revised Rules we will be able 
to discard our guidelines. 
If you have any suggestions, please let me know. 
Sincere! 
John E. Brockert, Director 
Bureau of Health Statistics 
(801) 538-6186 
Enclosure 
Office of Management Planning 
288 North 1460 West • PO Box 16700 • Salt Lake Oty Utah 84116-0700 • (801) 538-6186 
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Rule 1.4 Designation of Additional Offices 
Full-time local health officers may be designated by the Department to serve 
as the local registrar of vital statistics for the area they serve as 
healthofficer. They shall carry out their required duties without payment of 
any additional fee. For areas of the state not served by a full-time local 
health officer, the Department, acting through the State Registrar, shall 
designate an individual to serve as local registrar. 
The State Registrar shall delegate such duties and responsibilities for the 
local registrars as he deems necessary to insure the efficient operation of 
the system of vital statistics. Ihese may include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
(a) The receipt and processing of birth, death, and spontaneous fetal 
death records. This includes the receipt of these records from the 
person responsible for filing the record, checking it for accuracy 
and completeness, making a local copy, and forwarding the original 
to the State Registrar at least once a week. 
(b) Issuance of certified copies of birth, death, and fetal death 
certificates after receiving written authorization from the State 
Registrar. The records from which the certified copies are issued 
shall be the local copy of the original certificate. All forms and 
procedures used to issue the copies shall be provided or approved 
by the State Registrar. 
(c) Issuance of burial-transit and disinterment permits and other 
designated forms as prescribed by regulation or direction of the 
State Registrar. 
(d) Acting as the agent of the State Registrar in their designated area 
and providing assistance to physicians, hospitals, funeral 
directors, and others in matters related to the system of vital 
statistics. 
The State Registrar, with the approval of the Department, shall determine the 
responsibilities and duties of each office independently. 
Iftle 1.5 Name of Child 
Hie child's name should be determined by its1 parents. If the parents 
<$sagree on the child's name and they have never married each other or are 
separated or divorced, the custodial parent shall determine the child's name. 
t| the parents are married to each other and cannot agree on the child's name, 
ft may be left blank and added later by an Affidavit to Amend a Record or by 
court order. 
RULE 2. Infants of Unknown Parentage; Foundling Registration (Section 
26-2-6) 
Ihe report for an infant of unknown parentage shall be registered on a 
foundling certificate of live birth and shall, unless more definitive 
information is available: 
- 3 -
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Amendments shall be filed with and become part of the record to which it 
pertains. The original certificate shall be marked "Amended, 1 of 2," or 
however many parts the amendment may require. Subsequent parts will be marked 
accordingly. 
When an amendment is accepted, the State Registrar shall transmit copies of 
the amendment to the local registrar in whose office a copy of the original 
record is on file. 
Rule 3.3 Amendment of Medical and Health Data 
Whenever the originally furnished medical and health data of any record of 
death, fetal death, or live birth is modified by supplemental information, the 
certifying physician or medical examiner having knowledge of this information, 
may certify, under penalty of perjury, the changes necessary to make the 
information correct and file it with the state or local registrar. The cause 
of death information may also be amended by the physician who performs an 
autopsy on the deceased. 
This amendment shall be processed in the manner prescribed in Section 3.2 of 
these rules. 
Ilftfte 3.4 Acknowledgement of Paternity by Natural Parents 
A thild born to an unmarried mother may not have the father's name entered on 
tt# birth certificate unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgement of 
paternity. If the acknowledgement of paternity is signed and received before 
tie certificate is registered, the father's name and other related information 
4py be entered in the appropriate items on the original certificate. The 
ffknowledgement of paternity is transmitted with the original certificate to 
|§e State Registrar, where it is retained as documentary evidence. 
4Un acknowledgement of paternity received after the certificate is registered 
|s not acceptable for registration. Alternatively, the father's information 
|tay be added by amendment as specified in Rule 3.2. However, if another man 
is shown as the father of the child on the original certificate, the 
Correction can only be made following a judicial determination of paternity or 
following adoption. 
RULE 4 Delayed Registration of Birth (Section 26-2-8) 
Rule 4.1 Registration - Ten Days to One Year 
Certificates of birth filed after ten days, but within one year from the date 
of birth, shall be registered on the standard birth certificate in the manner 
prescribed in Section 26-2-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. Such 
certificate shall not be marked "Delayed." 
The State Registrar may require additional evidence in support of the facts of 
birth and/or an explanation of why the birth certificate was not filed within 
the required ten days. 
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PRISCILLA R U T H M A C D O U G A L L 
ATTORNKY AT L-AW 
3 - 4 6 KBNT LANK 
MADISON, WISCONSIN 83713 
eO62BB-207l 
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March 5, 19 79 
Lesley DuVall 
Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee 
State of Indiana 
State House 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Re: Senate Bill No. 81-
Statutory change of minors' 
names 
Dear Senator DuVall: 
Thank you for inviting my comments on Senate Bill No. 81 re-
specting the statutory changing of minors1 names. As I under-
stand from our conversation, that portion of the bill relating 
to the statutory changing of adults' names was deleted and I am 
therefore addressing my comments to that portion of the bill re-
lating to children's names only. 
As I mentioned to you on the telephone, there are several 
problems with the bill as drafted in light of the mandate for 
equal protection for women and the recognition of children's 
legal rights and privileges. There are several issues I could 
discuss, some of which I mentioned to you briefly, but the most 
obvious problem I see with the bill is that it appears to be 
patently designed to prevent women with children in their custody 
from statutorily changing their children's names if the father 
objects and contributes any support for the child and is in obey-
ance with a decree issued pursuant to IC 31-1-11'. 5. 
While this discrimination is phrased as a presumption, it 
appears, though "neutrally" worded,to clearly be written to give 
men the predominant naming rights of children. 
Do you mean the bill to app^y to the statutory changing of 
only the names of children born to married parents? 
The presumption is not only discriminatory, but runs contrary 
to the general presumption in favor of a custodial parent who 
is ordinarily entrusted with the "care and control" of a minor. 
A sex neutral statute could give any presumption to the custodial 
parent while still leaving the noncustodial parent the right to 
petition for a statutory name change of his/her minor child. Un-
less the custodial parent could be deprived of the control of 
his/her child in another area (for example, in changing the school 
or religion of the child), s/he should not be deprived of the 
control of the child's name, subject, of course, to the overriding 
standard of the child's best interests and the child's.own rights. 
A-3y 
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The bill docs mention the child's best interests as controlling 
the statutory name change of a minor, but does not provide for 
independent representation for the child to protect those interests 
or the child's independent rights. In practice the male judiciary 
has recited the "best interests of the child" as the appropriate 
standard for reviewing name changes where the parents disagree, 
but then has decided cases in such a way as to almost always favor 
the father over the mother. To avoid this, perhaps the bill 
could provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the 
child in cases where the parents disagree. I have seen guardians 
ad litem used well in cases of disagreement between parents in 
naming their children both after divorces and at births. 
To provide that the child's rights are preserved, the bill could: 
1) specifically recoqnize the child's preferences as a presumption 
equal to that of the custodial parent's at least after the age of 
10 or 12, and 2) require the consent of the child at a specific 
age, perhaps 14, the age recognized in some states as that at 
which a minor can change his/her name statutorily in his/her own 
right. 
I shall be happy to comment further and to work with you or 
any staff working on the bill in drafting a provision which is 
not sex discriminatory and which protects minors' rights and 
privileges. 
Sincerely, 
Priscilla Ruth MadQougall 
Judith Palmer, Executive Assistant to the Governor 
Richard C. Bodine, Representative 
Patrick Carroll, Senator 
John Donaldson, Chair, House Committee on the Judiciary 
Lynn Brundage, Indiana Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project 
ACLU, Women's Rights Project 
National Organization For Women 
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January 22, 1979 
PRINTING CODE—The parts in this style type are addi-
tions to the text of the existing section of the law. The 
parts in thio otyle type are deletions from the text of 
the existing section of the law. The absence of either 
of the above type styles in BT amendatory SECTION 
indicates that an entirely new section or chapter is to 
be added to the existing law. 
DIGEST 
Adds IC 34-4-6-1.1 to require parental consent to change 
the name oi a minor child; to change the procedure for a 
name change by requiring the reason for the change to be 
stated in the petition to the court, notice to be given seven 
days after the filing of the petition, specified information to 
be contained in the petition, and a hearing to determine 
whether the petition should be granted. Adds IC 34-4-6-2.1 
to require a hearing on any objections to the petition." 
Repeals IC 34-4-6-1, IC 34-4-6-2, IC 34-4-6-3, and IC 34-4-6-
4, which are the current change of name provisions. 
SENATE BILL No. 81 
A BILL FOR AN ACT to amend IC 34-4-6 concerning the 
procedure for changing an individual's name. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of 
Indiana: 
1 SECTION 1. IC 34-4-6 is amended by adding a NEW sec-
2 tion 1.1 to read as follows; Sec. 1.1. (a) An individual who 
3 wishes to change his name, or the name of his minor child, 
4 must present a verified petition stating in detail the reason 
5 the change is requested to the circuit court located in his 
6 county of residence. 
7 (b) Not more than seven (7) days from the date the peti-
8 tion is filed, the petitioner must publish notice of the peti-
9 tion in a newspaper of general circulation in the county of 
A-#> 
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1 the petitioner's residence. Notice must be given once a week 
2 for three (3) consecutive weeks. If a newspaper of general 
3 publication is not published in the petitioner's county of resi-
4 dence, then the notice must be published ir * newspaper of 
5 general publication in an adjoining county. 
6 (c) The notice required by subsection (b) must include: 
/ (1 The name of the petitioner. 
8 (2) The name of the person whose name is to be changed 
9 (if different from that of the petitioner). 
10 1.3} The new name desired. 
11 (4) The name of the court in which the action is pending 
12 (5) The date on which the petition was filed. 
13 (6) A statement of the rights of any person to appear at 
14 the hearing and to file objections. 
15 (d) Proof of publication must be made by filing a copy of 
16 the published notice, verincd by a disinterested party, with 
17 the court. 
18 e Except as provided by IC 31-3-1-6, if the petition is to 
19 change the name of a minor child, the written consent of the 
20 parents, or the written consent of the child's guardian if both 
21 parents are dead, must be filed with the petition. 
22 (f) Before a minor child's name may be changed, the par 
23 ents or guardian of the child must be served with a copy of 
24 the petition as required by the Indiana trial rules. 
25 SECTION 2. IC 344-6 is amended by adding a NEW sec-
26 tion 2.1 to read as follows: Sec. 2.1. (a) Except as provided 
27 under subsection (b), the court may hear the petition and 
28 issue a final decree after thirty (30) days from the later of: 
29 (1) the filing of proof of publication of the notice required 
30 under section 1.1 of this chapter; or 
31 (2) the service of the petition upon the parents or guard-
32 ian, or both, of a minor child. 
33 (b) The court shall set a date for a hearing on the petition 
34 if: 
35 (1) written objections have been filed; or 
36 (2) a parent or guardian of a minor child has refused or 
37 failed to give written consent under section l.Ke: ;•* this 
38 chapter. 
39 The court shall require that appropriate notice of the hear-
40 ing be given to the parent or guardian of the minor child or 
41 to any person who has filed written objections. In deciding 
42 on the petition to change the name of a minor child, the 
43 court shall be guided by the best interest of the child rule 
44 under IC 31-1-11.5-21. However, there is a presumption in 
45 favor of a parent of a minor child who: 
rt~9/ 
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1 li) has been making support payments and fulfilling 
2 other duties in accordance with a decree issued under IC 31-
3 1-11.5; and 
4 (ii) objects to the proposed name change of the child. 
5 SECTION 3. IC 34-4-5-1, IC 34-4-6-2, IC 34-4-6-3, and IC 
6 34-4-6-4 are repealed. 
COMMITTEE REPORT 
Mr. President: Your Committee on Judiciary which was 
referred Senate Bill No. 81, has had the same under consid-
eration and begs leave to report the same back to the Senate 
with the recommendation that said bill be amended as fol-
lows: 
Page 2, line 12, delete "interested party" and insert in 
roman "person". 
Page 2, delete line 25 and insert in roman the following: 
"SECTION 2. IC 34-4-6 is amended by adding a NEW sec-
tion 2.1 to read as follows: Sec. 2.1. (a) Except as provided 
under subsection (b), the court may hear the petition and 
issue a final decree after thirty (30) days from the later of: 
(1) the filing of proof of publication of the notice required 
under section 1.1 of this chapter; or 
(2) the service of the petition upon the parents or guard-
ian, or both, of a minor child. 
(b) The court shall set a date for a hearing on the petition 
if: 
(1) written objections have been filed; or 
(2) a parent or guardian of a minor child has refused or 
failed to give written consent under section 1.1(e) of this 
chapter. 
The court shall require that appropriate notice of the hear-
ing be given to the parent or guardian of the minor child or 
to any person who has filed written objections. In deciding 
on the petition to change the name of a minor child, the 
court shall be guided by the best interest of the child rule 
under IC 31-1-11.5-21. However, there is a presumptior in 
favor of a parent of a minor child who: 
(i) has been making support payments and fulfilling 
other duties in accordance with a decree issued under IC 31-
1-11.5; and 
/ ' - # - ? 
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(ii) objects to the proposed name change of the child.". 
Page 2, delete lines 26, 27 and 28. 
Page 3, delete lines 1-11, inclusive. 
(Reference is made to bill as introduced) 
and when so amended that said bill do pass. 
DUVALL, Chairman 
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STATE OP MINNESOTA 
IN COURT OF APPEALS 
C7-86-283 
Aitkin County 
Aitkin County Family Service 
Agency and Charlene DeVonne 
Evelyn Hoglund, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
Frank Lee Girard, 
Respondent, 
Crippen, Judge 
John R. Leitner 
Aitkin County Attorney 
Anne L. Mohaupt 
Assistant County Attorney 
Courthouse Annex 
Aitkin, MN 56431 
Richard A* Zimmerman 
P. 0. Box 388 
Aitkin, MN 56431 
Filed July 29, 1986 
Wayne Tschimperle, Clerk 
Minnesota Appellate Courts 
S Y L L A B U S 
1. A minor child's name may be changed only when the 
change promotes the child's best interests. 
2. Trial courts must make particularized findings 
supporting their reasons for granting or denying an application 
to change a child's surname. 
3. When the custodial parent objects to changing the 
child's surname and the evidence does not show that the failure 
to change the name will be detrimental to the preservation of 
the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent, it is in 
the best interests of the child to follow the custodial parent's 
preference. 
Reversed. 
/i-W 
Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judgef Leslie, 
Judge, and Nierengarten, Judge, with oral argument waived. 
O P I N I O N 
CRIPPEN, Judge 
Charlene Hoglund appeals from the trial court's judgment 
changing the surname of her two minor children from Hoglund to 
Girard, the surname of the children's biological father. We 
reverse. 
FACTS 
Appellant Charlene Hoglund and respondent Frank Girard lived 
together for about six years and had two children, Orville Lee, 
born February 18f 1981, and Bobby Jean, born October 11, 1982. 
Sometime after Bobby Jean was born, respondent moved out of the 
home where he had been living with appellant and the children. 
In November 1985, appellant brought a paternity action against 
respondent. Respondent acknowledged his paternity and was 
accordingly adjudicated the father of the children. 
In the same proceeding, respondent petitioned the court to 
change the children's surname from Hoglund to Girard. The trial 
court record shows that when the children were born, both were 
given appellant's surname of Hoglund. In their daily life, they 
have always used the surname Hoglund. Respondent, however, also 
testified that "all his friends and everybody" called the 
children "Girard" when he was living with appellant. The 
children have lived continuously with appellant; respondent has 
visited with them about once a month since he and appellant 
stopped living together. 
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Respondent testified that he does not care if the children 
continue to use Hoglund as their surname in their daily lives, 
but that he nevertheless wants their name to be changed legally 
to Girard. He explained that he was the only son in his family 
that named a son after his father, that his father had expressed 
a dying wish that the Girard name be carried forward, and that 
he wanted to fulfill his father's wish. He also expressed his 
ongoing desire to marry appellant and raise the children 
together with her, and stated that even if he and appellant do 
not marry, he still wants the children to have his name in 
recognition that he is their father. 
Appellant testified that she objected to a change in the 
children's surname and that the change would confuse them. She 
testified that the children, now ages 5 and 3, are not old 
enough to meaningfully tell her which name they would like to 
keep. In regard to respondent's desire to marry her, appellant 
testified that she would "like to give it a try" but that she 
would first want to live with respondent "for awhile and see how 
things work out." 
In addition to the parties' testimony, the court also 
considered a letter from an Aitkin County Family Service Agency 
social worker, which recommended that the children's surname 
remain Hoglund. The social worker wrote that the benefit of 
changing the name is outweighed by the possible confusion and 
disruption that could ensue, and that because appellant has been 
and continues to be the primary parent of the children, her wish 
to maintain the Hoglund name should be granted. 
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The trial court issued findings that appellant and 
respondent are the parents of the two children and that 
respondent "is desirous of changing the surnames of the children 
to Girard." The court then ordered that the children's name be 
changed to Girard* Charlene Hoglund appeals from the judgment 
entered upon the court's order. 
ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that 
the children's surname be changed? 
ANALYSIS 
A trial court shall grant an application for a change in a 
minor child's name unless the court finds that the change is not 
in the best interests of the child. See Minn. Stat. § 259.11 
(1984). Applying the statutef the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
held that the "welfare of the children must ultimately be the 
controlling consideration in any change of status." Robinson v. 
Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 35, 223 N.W.2d 138# 140 (1974). 
In Robinson, the court focused on the "significant societal 
implications" of changing a child's name from the natural 
father's name following the divorce of the child's parents and 
the grant of custody to the child's mother. The court noted 
that the "link between a father and child in circumstances such 
as these is uncertain at best, and a change of name could 
further weaken, if not sever," the bond between a noncustodial 
father and the child, ^d. at 35-36, 223 N.W.2d at 140. 
This concern is notably absent from the present case, where 
the children's parents were never married and the children have 
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never regularly used their father's name. Here the father does 
not oppose change but seeks it. In addition, independent of the 
surname of the children, both parties agree that respondent has 
established a positive and loving relationship with the 
children, that both children know respondent is their father, 
and that he sees the children on a regular basis. Respondent's 
testimony that his primary interest is to fulfill his father's 
wishes and not to ensure that the children identify with the 
name Girard in their daily lives also indicates that the name 
change would not affect his ongoing parental relationship with 
the children. 
In 1981, the supreme court took the "opportunity to 
elucidate [its] decision in Robinson." In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 
298, 301 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982). In 
Saxton, the court reaffirmed that a name change should be 
granted "only when the change promotes the child's best 
interests." Ici. In Robinson, the court said that change of a 
child's surname over the objection of a parent should be 
considered with "great caution" and only where "the evidence is 
clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child 
necessitates such change." Robinson, 302 Minn, at 36, 233 
N.W.2d at 140. Saxton specified several factors that trial 
courts may consider in determining the child's best interests. 
Further, the court stated that trial courts need not limit their 
consideration to those factors, but that they should set out 
their reasons for granting or .denying an application to change 
the child's surname. Id. 
- 5 -
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Other than stating that respondent desired the name change, 
the trial court here did not state reasons for granting 
respondent's petition. Most notably, the trial court made no 
findings on the best interests of the children. 
Two of the factors articulated in Saxton are particularly 
important here, namely, the length of time the child has borne a 
given name, and the difficulties, harassment or embarrassment 
that the child may experience from bearing the present or the 
proposed name.* The record shows that the children have borne 
the Hoglund name throughout their lives and that appellant 
testified that a change of name would cause adjustment 
difficulties for them. The record also includes the 
recommendation from the Aitkin County social worker, a 
recommendation that the trial court specifically waited to 
receive before holding the hearing on the proposed name change, 
which states her belief that any benefit of a name change would 
be outweighed by the possible confusion and disruption that 
could result from the change. 
In addition, absent evidence that the change will be 
detrimental to the preservation of the children's relationship 
with their father, we see no reason to put aside the preference 
expressed by their custodial parent, the children's mother. It 
1. The other factors noted in Saxton do not bear on the present 
case. They are: (1) the child's preference (the children 
here are too young to express a preference); (2) the effect 
of the change on the child's relationship with each parent 
(the relative unimportance of this factor has already been 
noted in the discussion on Robinson); and (3) the degree of 
community respect associated with the present and the 
proposed names (neither parent testified that one name 
evokes a greater degree of community respect than the 
other). 
- 6 -
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is in the best interest of such young children to provide them 
with stability and continuity. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 
705, 711 (Minn. 1985). The preservation of the family unit as 
they have always known it, including having the same name as 
their custodial parent, is an element of that continuity. 
Appellant has been and continues to be primarily responsible for 
the welfare of the children. Under these circumstances, the 
evidence does not show that the substantial welfare of the 
children necessitates a change of name. 
The absence of particularized findings as well as the trial 
court's focus on respondent's desire to change the children's 
name indicates that the trial court relied on the Robinson 
doctrine without considering its development in Saxton.2 
Robinson refers to 
the natural and appropriate desire of the father 
to have his children bear and perpetuate his name, 
as well as * * * the desirability of the child 
knowing his own parentage. 
Robinson, 302 Minn, at 36, 223 N.W.2d at 140. Saxton, however, 
in discussing that concern, refers to the effect of a name 
change on the child's relationship with each parent. Saxton, 
309 N.W.2d at 301. Moreover, although this factor was of 
primary concern in Robinson, both that case and Saxton included 
2. At the hearing on the petition, counsel for appellant cited 
Robinson but not Saxton to the court as controlling 
authority. The judge declined to make a decision 
immediately following the hearing, stating that he first 
wanted to review Robinson. 
- 7 -
ri-so 
it as only one among several factors to be considered. IxJ. at 
302* Here, however, the court's findings do not reflect 
consideration of any other relevant factors. 
The trial judge's questioning of the parties also reveals 
his reliance on a mistaken presumption of law that may have 
influenced the court's final decision. The judge expressed his 
belief that if the parties were to marry, the children's names 
would automatically convert to Girard. This is error; because 
the surname on the children's birth certificates is Hoglund, an 
application for a name change is necessary regardless of the 
parties' marital choices. See Minn. Stat. § 259.10 (1984). The 
merit for a change of name may increase upon the marriage of the 
parties; however, until application is made and granted, their 
names will continue to be Hoglund. 
We recognize the validity of respondent's desire to 
perpetuate his family's name. This desire, however, is 
primarily aimed towards Orville, who was named after 
respondent's father, and not towards Bobby Jean, making it even 
less clear that the change of name would be in the best 
interests of both children. As noted in Robinson, the children 
may some day voluntarily decide to change their name to Girard. 
See Robinson, 302 Minn, at 38, 223 N.W.2d at 141. At the 
present time, however, the evidence is insufficient to show that 
a change of name would promote their best interests. 
D E C I S I O N 
The trial court erred in granting respondent's petition to 
change the surname of the parties' children over appellant's 
- 8 -
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objection. Respondent's reasons for desiring a change of cde 
children's names are not clear and compelling evidence that the 
substantial welfare of the children necessitates a change. 
Reversed. 
zaQj^iite 
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Supreme Court of Utah 
athleen Jacobson and the State of Utah, 
y and through Utah State Department of 
•ocial Services, 
Appellants, 
-vs.-- Fourth Judicial District Court 
Utah County, 
Jail Jacobson, Civil Case No. 67, 957 
Respondent. Supreme Court Case No. 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Change of Title of Action 
I, Kathleen Hamby, execute this affidavit in support of my Motion for 
Change of Title of Action, and state: 
1. I am the Appellant in the action. 
2. I assumed the surname Hamby following my marriage to Richard 
L. Hamby on July 16, 1973. 
3. I gave the surname Hamby to my son born of that marriage, Clint, 
and he has born it since his birth on July 9, 19?4. 
4. Following my divorce from Richard Hamby on July 13, 1979, I 
continued to use the surname Hamby. 
5. On June 14, 1983 I gave birth to another son, Kelly Lynn, and 
named him with the surname Hamby. Kelly's biological father is Gail 
Jacobson. 
6. On November 29, 1983 I married Gail Jacobson and assumed the 
surname Jacobson for the period of November 29, 1983 to October 20, 
1984 at which time I resumed the use of my name Hamby. 
7. Since October 20, 1984 I have used the name Hamby, I consider it 
my name and I never intend to use any other surname than Hamby for the 
remainder of my natural life, 
8. I have all of my identification in the surname Hamby, including 
my Utah driver's license, my Utah chauffeur's licence, my employment 
and social security records, my bank records and all other identification. 
9. All my friends, family and business associates know me as 
Kathleen Hamby. 
10. I signed papers connected with this lawsuit in the name Jacobson 
only becaase my attorney Donald Elkins, who prepared the papers, told me 
that I had to sign my name as Jacobson. 
11. When I was divorced from Gail Jacobson on April 11, 1985 my name 
change was included in the divorce decree. 
12. On April 13, 1985 following my divorce I gave birth to another 
son, Kevin, whose biological father is Gail Jacobson. 
Dated this 7 day of May, 1986. 
athleen Hambv / K y
P.O. Box 188 
Goshen, Utah 8,4663 A J U U 5 U C H , U L c l l l O H U U J 
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